Wayzata World Factbook 1996/The World Factbook - 1996 Edition - Wayzata Technology (3079) (1996).iso/pc/text/humanrts/serbia_a.txu

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TITLE: SERBIA-MONTENEGRO HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES, 1994
AUTHOR: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DATE: FEBRUARY 1995



Section 2  Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

     a.  Freedom of Speech and the Press

Although freedom of press and speech is provided for under law,
this right is not respected in practice.  Republic authorities
use provisions of the Federal Criminal Code to restrict freedom
of speech.  For instance, the person of the President is
protected by law from criticism.  Federal laws are being used
to overturn privatization processes and subvert independent
media into state controlled media (Borba and Studio B).
Federal law has also been used to set up progovernment radio
and television stations run by local party heads throughout
Serbia.  The regime controls frequency allocations for
broadcasters and has enormous influence on supplies and
revenues for the print media.  Although it continued to
tolerate the independent but low-circulation print media of
Borba and Vreme in Belgrade, both often critical of the
Government, most of the population nationwide is dependent for
its news on electronic media firmly under government control.
The Government again blocked the attempts of independent
television station Studio B and independent radio station B-92
to expand transmission of their broadcasts.

Milosevic's control of the media, particularly state
television, is vital to the strength of his regime.  Through
Serbian Radio and Television (RTS), the Government exerts
editorial control over all news programming.  The regime
abandoned the most blatant forms of anti-Muslim propaganda in
1994, except in the tabloid press, but news concerning non-Serb
ethnic minorities continued to receive very slanted and hostile
coverage.  The authorities generally tolerated publication of
material critical of the Government as long as dissident voices
were kept off television and out of mass-market publications.
They dismissed the editor of the semi-independent Television
Politika from his position in August and fired him from the
company after he gave prime-time coverage to one of Milosevic's
most consistent critics.

Shortages of newsprint caused by the deteriorating economy
enabled the Government selectively to direct supplies to
favored publications and to reduce financial support of
independent journals.  Serbian customs authorities seized
several shipments of equipment and newsprint provided by the
Soros Foundation for Belgrade independent daily Borba and radio
B-92   They later negotiated a reduction in the initial demand
for a ransom amounting to thousands of dollars.  In December,
Borba was forced to reduce its circulation and number of pages
because it could not obtain sufficient newsprint.

The Serbian government, a minority shareholder in the semi-
independent Belgrade daily Borba, tried to use its 17-percent
share to exercise full control over the newspaper.  In
September the Government began court proceedings against Borba
claiming the means by which it had formed its stock company
were illegal.  In late December, federal government authorities
through manipulation of the federal courts took over management
of Borba, installing the head of the Federal Secretariat for
Information as editor.  In Vojvodina, the Hungarian-language
independent newspaper Magyar Szo continued to resist attempts
to merge with a Serbian publishing house, fearing financial
mismanagement would force it to close.  B-92 has not yet been
officially licensed and must continue to operate as a "pirate"
radio station.

Proposed legislation to regulate foreign investment in domestic
media would make Serbian press connections with foreigners or
foreign support of Serbian media illegal under most
circumstances.  In April the "FRY" Ministry of Information
stripped a total of 13 correspondents and staff working for
foreign news agencies (most of them ethnic Serbs) of their
accreditations for allegedly engaging in "anti-Serbian
activities."  It did not explain why it had singled out these
journalists.  One American reporter who spoke with
representatives of the Serbian independent media on the record
about the revocation of credentials was given 5 days to leave
the country.

Studio B continued to struggle for survival.  It faced eviction
from its premises in favor of a proregime firm.  Although
Serbian authorities finally approved repeater stations for it,
they refused to vacate the allocated mountaintop areas,
preventing the station from extending its range of reception
beyond Belgrade.  Studio B lost an important sponsor and was
forced to cancel a planned folk festival when RTS threatened
the singers with loss of their RTS recording contracts if they
cooperated with the station.

In March federal authorities prohibited ham radio operators
from transmitting messages to Bosnia.  For many people in
Serbia-Montenegro, the estimated 15 private radio clubs were
their only link to friends and relatives still in Bosnia.
Military and civilian officials, accusing the radio operators
of espionage and passing militarily significant messages to the
Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, began confiscating radio
equipment and harassing the operators.

Despite a precarious existence, the only Albanian-language
newspaper, Bujku, continued to be published, and a number of
new Albanian-language weeklies began publication.  Bujku, which
is independent of Belgrade and uncensored, clearly reflects the
views of the Kosovar Albanian LDK leadership.  As such, it is
the main source of information for the Albanian community.
Radio and Television Pristina, however, remain firmly under the
control of RTS and the ruling Socialist Party.  In June
Belgrade student radio Indeks went on strike to protest the
appointment of a new editor in chief forced on the station by
the Socialist Party's youth movement.  For some time, Indeks
played only the MTV satellite audio signal; it is now off the
air, pending "studio refurbishment."

     b.  Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Although the Federal Constitution provides for freedom of
peaceful assembly and association, the authorities severely
restricted these freedoms, applying the laws and regulations in
a capricious fashion.  Kosovo was singled out for particular
restrictions of assembly, and Serbian authorities targeted
so-called parallel ethnic Albanian social structures for
harassment.  In February and March, local authorities in
Pristina shut down both the independent Kosovo Academy of Arts
and Sciences and the Institute for Albanian Studies, beating
Institute director Sadri Fetiu and several staff members in the
process.  Local authorities, who had been threatening to close
the Academy of Arts and Sciences for more than 2 years,
considered it a symbol of the Kosovar separatist movement.

As of midyear, police conducted some 420 raids on schools in
the parallel Albanian educational system.  In February they
arrested Tafil Bahimja, director of an Albanian-language
primary school in Kraljane, and interrogated him about the
school's curriculum, threatening him with physical harm.

The authorities also severely restricted Albanian political
organizations.  The then Serbian district chief for Kosovo
issued two separate public calls for a ban on all LDK activity
in May.  Arkan and his Party of Serbian Unity (SSJ) made
similar repeated, public demands.  Although the district chief
was subsequently dismissed, Belgrade authorities did not
dispute his contention that the LDK was actively working to
undermine the Serbian constitutional order.  In July police
raided a meeting of the Social Democratic Party in Kosovo
Mitrovica, beating up the general secretary and three members
of the presidency.  The president, Bilim Bislimi, was
subsequently arrested.

In Sandzak, Serb authorities have arrested and harassed
politically active Muslims, primarily because of their
membership in the Party of Democratic Action.  With most of the
Muslim leadership in prison or in exile, the Serbian
authorities succeeded in forging an association between
political involvement and police harassment that inhibited the
exercise of free political expression and made political
activity a visibly risky proposition.

     c.  Freedom of Religion

There is no state religion, but the Government gives
preferential treatment to the Serbian Orthodox Church, to which
the majority of Serbs belong--including access to state-run
television for religious events.

There are no legal restrictions on the practice of religion,
but police condoned periodic violence against religious
facilities used by ethnic minorities and their investigations
into the fire-bombing attacks on Catholic churches in Vojvodina
or vandalism of mosques in Sandzak were perfunctory.

One human rights organization based in Novi Pazar reported that
police summoned even more people than usual for interrogation
on Muslim religious holidays.  The Serbian Orthodox hierarchy
in 1994 adopted a more stridently nationalistic tone in regard
to events in Bosnia, a development that had a chilling impact
on members of other faiths and non-Serb ethnic groups.

     d.  Freedom of Movement Within the Country, Foreign
         Travel, Emigration, and Repatriation

The Constitution provides for freedom of movement.  The regime
generally does not require exit visas except for travel to
Albania, and makes passports available to most citizens, while
restricting the right to travel of many Kosovar Albanians.
Serbian authorities have generally allowed ethnic Albanian
leaders, including LDK leader Ibrahim Rugova, to leave the
country and return, even though they consider his party and
other ethnic Albanian parties illegal.

Ethnic Albanians have frequently complained of harassment at
border crossings, generally when entering from Hungary or at
the border between Kosovo and Macedonia.  There have been
numerous reports of border guards confiscating foreign currency
or passports from travelers, as well as occasional complaints
of physical ill-treatment.  Serbian border guards and customs
officials harassed Kosovar Albanians returning from abroad,
sometimes refusing to recognize the validity of legitimate
passports held by ethnic Albanians repatriated from Western
European countries.

Montenegrin authorities "deported" Serbian ultranationalist
Radical Party leader Vojislav Seselj to Serbia for making
comments at a political rally that were deemed "offensive to
the Republic of Montenegro and its leaders."  It also expelled
34 other Radical Party deputies to Serbia on a government-owned
airplane.  Seselj's expulsion, almost certainly sanctioned at
the highest political levels, was a direct violation of the
constitutional guarantees on freedom of movement.

Many refugees from the Bosnian conflict who had been living in
collective centers or with host families in Serbia-Montenegro
returned to their homes in Bosnia (or to homes that had been
"cleansed" of their previous Muslim tenants).  Serbian and
Montenegrin authorities encouraged this exodus by threatening
to strip refugees of their status or force them to serve in the
Bosnian Serb army.  In violation of both international
convention and Serbian law, the Yugoslav army cooperated
closely with the Bosnian Serb military in a roundup of refugees
in January and February.  In May Serbian authorities stripped
over 100,000 people of their refugee status.  Although they did
not forcibly expel them, they induced many to return to
"liberated" eastern Bosnia.  Lawyers counseling the refugees
who were called up for military service believed that both the
Serbian Red Cross and the Serbian Committee for Refugees were
supplying the military with the names and addresses of
draft-age males.

Many people succeeded in evading military service, and the
authorities did not pursue draft dodgers systematically.
However, the Government threatened to begin proceedings against
ethnic Albanians living abroad who had avoided military service
if they were repatriated to the "FRY."  More typically, police
who picked up young Kosovar Albanians found to be evading draft
notices took them to army barracks where they were beaten and
eventually released.

Section 3  Respect for Political Rights:  The Right of Citizens
           to Change Their Government

The Constitution provides for this right, but in practice
citizens are prevented from exercising it by the Milosevic
Government's monopoly of mass media and of the electoral
process.  In the December 1993 elections, the authorities
denied opposition parties equal access to the state-run media
and omitted many voters from the registration lists.  Observers
noted numerous voting irregularities and raised serious
questions as to the accuracy of the vote count.

Slobodan Milosevic dominates the political system in Serbia-
Montenegro.  Although formally president of Serbia, one of the
two constituent republics in the so-called Yugoslav Federal
Republic, Milosevic first weakened the authorities of the
Federal Government through his control of the Serbian police,
the army, and the state administration, and then placed his
followers in key positions, including the Federal President and
the Federal Prime Minister.  Milosevic greatly circumscribes
the Montenegrin government's sphere for independent action as
he does not tolerate significant divergence from the Serbian
party line.

The domestic political opposition, hamstrung by these
extralegal means of political control, proved incapable of
providing an effective alternative to the ruling Socialist
Party (SPS).  Although the SPS does not control an absolute
majority of seats in the Serbian Parliament, it managed to
coopt one of the opposition parties, allowing the Socialists to
form the Government in January.  In Montenegro, where the
ruling Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) enjoys an absolute
majority, opposition parliamentarians complained that the
Government often railroaded legislation through Parliament
without time for adequate debate.  In both Serbia and
Montenegro, the ruling parties have effectively blocked
legislation that would loosen their control over the state-run
media.

Ethnic Serbs dominate the political leadership in Serbia.  Few
members of other ethnic groups play any role at the top levels
of government or the state-run economy.  The same is true of
women (see Section 5), although in both instances there are no
legal restrictions preventing advancement.  Ethnic Albanians,
as a matter of principle, refuse to take part in the electoral
process, and therefore have little representation.

Section 4  Governmental Attitude Regarding International and
           Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations
           of Human Rights

Local human rights monitors (Serbs as well as members of ethnic
minorities) worked under difficult circumstances amid public
insinuations by ultranationalist leaders and sometimes
government officials that they were traitors.  Police routinely
searched human rights offices in Kosovo, confiscated documents,
and harassed their employees.

A number of independent human rights organizations exist in
Serbia-Montenegro, researching and gathering information on
abuses and publicizing such cases.  Several operate out of
Kosovo, including the Council for the Defense of Human Rights
and Freedoms and the Kosovo Helsinki Committee.  In the Sandzak
region, a separate Council for the Protection of Human Rights
and Freedoms monitors abuses against the local Muslim
population and produces comprehensive reports.

The Belgrade-based Humanitarian Law Fund and the Center for
Antiwar Action (CAA) have a broader scope of activities,
researching human rights abuses throughout the "FRY" and, on
occasion, elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia.  The CAA also
sponsors symposia and lectures and runs a small publishing
house.  CAA members set up a hot line providing legal counsel
to refugees who received military induction notices and formed
the Committee to Free Veljko Dzakula when the Serbian security
service kidnaped him in January (see Section 1.d.).  Serbian
authorities carefully monitor the activities of independent
human rights agencies but generally do not subject them to
overt harassment.

The governments of Serbia and Montenegro formally maintain that
they have no objection to international organizations
conducting human rights investigations on their territories.
However, they hindered such activities and regularly rejected
the findings of human rights groups.  Serbian authorities
refused to issue visas to representatives of a number of human
rights organizations, including Amnesty International.  "FRY"
authorities soundly rebuffed numerous approaches about allowing
the reintroduction of the CSCE Long-Duration Missions to
Kosovo, Vojvodina and Sandzak.  Officials on all levels
maintained that the CSCE must first reinstate the "FRY" before
it would be allowed to operate in Serbia-Montenegro.

Diplomats from various CSCE countries stationed in Belgrade and
traveling in groups were frequently denied meetings with
Serbian authorities who considered them de facto CSCE observers
carrying out an expired mandate.  In May Foreign Ministry
officials made veiled threats to expel Embassy personnel who
took part in CSCE-sponsored trips outside Belgrade.  In October
the Foreign Ministry again complained about CSCE Embassy
members traveling to Kosovo, Sandzak, and Vojvodina.
Repressive acts against ethnic minorities have increased
significantly since the CSCE missions in Kosovo, Sandzak, and
Vojvodina departed.  In Kosovo, five members of the Pec ethnic
Albanian communal leadership, on trial in early December for
"violating the territorial integrity of the state," were
questioned extensively in court about their contacts with the
former CSCE observer mission, even though they pointed out that
the mission had been present legally and with the permission of
Serb authorities.

In a change from previous public statements that they would not
cooperate with the U.N. War Crimes Tribunal, Serbian officials
in 1994 stated they would offer limited cooperation with the
Tribunal to the extent the law allowed.  Both the Serbian and
Federal Constitutions forbid extradition.  The Government
stated it will try those who committed war crimes within the
country, and has begun proceedings in the case of the Vukovic
brothers who are accused of killing Muslims in Bosnia.

Section 5  Discrimination Based on Race, Sex, Religion,
           Disability, Language, or Social Status

While federal and republic laws provide for equal rights to all
citizens, regardless of ethnic group, religion, language, or
social status and prohibits discrimination against women, in
reality the system provides little protection to such groups.

     Women

Traditional patriarchal ideas of gender roles, which hold that
women should be subservient to the male members of their
family, have long subjected women to discrimination.  The
hostile atmosphere of oppressive nationalism fostered by the
regime's war on non-Serbs and the increasingly precarious
financial situation of most families have exacerbated the
traditionally high level of domestic violence.  The majority of
Serb refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina moved in with
relatives or friends and received only minimal support from
international refugee agencies.  The strain of living for
2 years in poverty and overcrowded conditions resulted in
family violence, particularly wife beatings, which human rights
organizations report was largely ignored by authorities.  While
legal recourse is theoretically available to victims of
domestic violence, few women, most of whom are fearful of being
rejected by their family, are willing to risk making a formal
complaint.  Police rarely investigate women's complaints
seriously.

In the early 1990s, women's rights organizations in Serbia,
originally formed around a strictly antiwar agenda, expanded
the scope of their activities as they recognized the growing
need to help female victims of the Yugoslav wars.  The Center
for Antiwar Action, in cooperation with a number of women's
rights groups, opened a hot line for rape victims.  The flood
of calls overwhelmed the small staff, and programs geared
towards assisting and counseling victims of rape have
proliferated.  In the summer of 1994, two of the largest
organizations, Women in Black and the SOS hot line, opened a
center for juvenile females and sponsored assistance programs
for women refugees in camps throughout the country.

The apolitical character of Serbia's feminist organizations
allowed them to operate with little overt opposition from local
authorities who, however, regularly ignored their protest
demonstrations.  Women in Black continued to hold weekly silent
protest meetings, for which they received explicit police
permission.  Police, however, refused permission for a protest
meeting that was to be held on a major Belgrade bridge in order
to draw attention to the destruction of the Mostar bridge in
Herzegovina.  Feminist groups organized and held conferences in
Belgrade and Novi Sad with the participation of women activists
from abroad.

Women are entitled to equal pay for equal work.  However, they
are vastly underrepresented at the top levels of government,
state-run industry, and academic institutions.  Maternity leave
is usually granted for 1 year.  President Milosevic rejected a
law limiting the availability of abortion as a restriction on
women's rights, the first time the feminist community has found
itself allied with the Serbian President.

     Children

Police violence against non-Serb children (see Section 1.c.) is
the primary abuse.  Otherwise, there is no pattern of
governmental or societal abuse against children, nor is child
prostitution condoned.  Children are not conscripted into the
army.

     National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities

The ethnic minorities of Serbia-Montenegro suffered
discrimination in all respects as the "FRY" continued its
policy of "ethnic cleansing" as a means of creating "Greater
Serbia" (see Section 1).  In addition to the abuses described
elsewhere in this report, there were credible reports that
qualified Muslims or ethnic Albanians continued to be fired
from their jobs on the basis of religion or ethnicity.
Members of ethnic minorities were badly treated in the armed
forces in which they were viewed with suspicion and often
outright hostility.  In Kosovo, court proceedings, formerly
conducted in the defendant's language, are now conducted in
Serbian; an interpreter is provided if necessary.

Traditional societal discrimination against the substantial
Roma population remains widespread.  The two Roma parties are
not well organized and do not play a role in the political life
of the country commensurate with their numbers.  The Roma have
the right to vote, and there is no legal discrimination.
However, local authorities apparently condone and even
participate in their harassment and intimidation.

     Religious Minorities

In the former Yugoslavia, religion and ethnicity are so closely
intertwined as to be inseparable.  "Muslims," for example, are
considered an ethnic rather than a religious minority, although
they are increasingly referred to as "Serbs of Muslim faith" in
official propaganda.

Serious discrimination and harassment of Serbia's religious
minorities continued, especially in the Kosovo and Sandzak
regions.  Violence against the Catholic minority in
Vojvodina--largely made up of ethnic Hungarians and
Croatians--is also a continuing problem.  Individual Catholics
were targeted for harassment by Orthodox "Chetniks," and a
number of Catholic churches were bombed (see Section 2.c.).

     People with Disabilities

There is no formal legislation to provide equal rights for the
disabled.  Only public buildings are required to provide access
for the disabled.  Plans for the Belgrade metro envisage
elevator access for the disabled at all stops.

Section 6  Worker Rights

     a.  The Right of Association

All workers (except military personnel) have the legal right to
form or join unions.  Unions are either official
(government-affiliated) or independent organizations.  Workers
in the official unions, whether Serb or non-Serb, have little
real voice in their unions, and their bargaining leverage is
circumscribed by the Government.  Consequently, they have
achieved little in terms of bettering their condition.  They
are ostensibly permitted to join the independent unions, but
these are so weak that they have been largely ineffective.

     b.  The Right to Organize and Bargain Collectively

While this right is guaranteed in law, collective bargaining is
rudimentary.  Individual unions tend to be very limited and
pragmatic in their aims, unable to join with unions
representing workers in other sectors and bargain together for
a common purpose, such as to eliminate safety hazards in the
workplace or to provide certain minimum health conditions.  The
overall result is a highly fragmented labor organizational
structure composed of workers who relate to the needs of their
individual union but rarely to those of other workers.

     c.  Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

Forced labor is prohibited by law and is not known to occur.

     d.  Minimum Age for Employment of Children

The minimum age for employment is 16, although in villages and
farming communities it is not unusual to find younger children
at work assisting their families.  With the fall in industrial
production by two-thirds compared with 1989, factories and
stores have retained only their most experienced and senior
workers.  Over the past year it was extremely unusual to find a
teenager in Belgrade working at any full-time or even part-time
job.  Unemployment, which unofficially ran in excess of 50
percent, was concentrated more highly among young, unskilled
workers.

     e.  Acceptable Conditions of Work

The economic decline, which began at the beginning in 1991 and
was accelerated by the onset of U.N. economic sanctions in May
1992, continued to exert a major influence on the conditions of
work.  While the Government succeeded in stabilizing prices
through much of 1994, a large gap remained between prices and
wages.  By November the average monthly wage had risen to about
$94 (255 dinars) at the current black market rates.  While
there is no official poverty line in Serbia-Montenegro, banking
and finance officials have used 250-300 dinars as an
"unofficial" poverty level for the average wage earner.  The
minimum wage, which is established in December by negotiation
among the Government, the chambers of commerce, and the unions
(both official and unofficial) was about $37 (90 dinars) at the
black market exchange rate.

While the official workweek was listed as 40 hours, many
employees worked fewer hours due to the economic slowdown.
These employees remained, for the most part, on enterprise
payrolls, continuing to draw a minimum monthly salary--between
$29.50 and $59 (50 and 100 dinars)--plus food supplements as
available.  The Government, which previously assumed
responsibility for providing redundant workers with a minimum
"unemployment" payment, shifted this responsibility in the last
half of the year to enterprises.  Many enterprises attempted to
trim these workers, but concerted action by both official and
independent unions may have helped to prevent further massive
layoffs in the economy.

Federal and republic laws and regulations regulate occupational
health and safety, but enforcement is lax.